Introduction

The period of the Bolshevik consolidation power (1917 – 1924) was the foundational period of the Soviet Union. It began in October 1917 when the Bolsheviks, claiming to represent the soviet movement, took power in a coup in Petrograd (St. Petersburg). This coup did not decide the fate of Russia but ushered in yet another contest for the domination of the former tsarist empire and its borderlands to the west, south and east.1 The period 1917-24 included a bitter civil war, experimentation with economic and social reforms and the collapse of many of the Bolsheviks’ stated global and domestic aims. Although there is no clear ‘end date’ for the consolidation of power a good case can be made for 1924 when Vladimir Lenin passed away after a long period illness and the first formal constitution of the USSR was promulgated. Lenin’s death accelerated a power struggle already under way among leading men of the Party that ultimately brought Joseph Stalin forward as the new leader of the Party by the late 1920s.

In NESA’s new (2017) version of the Russian/Soviet National Study, the first dot-point under the ‘focus of study’ requires students to investigate: ‘the impact of the Bolshevik consolidation of power, including the creation of the USSR’. We would argue that although this is only one dot-point, reading the historiography would suggest that it is far from simple. In fact, it directly links to aspects of many of this topic’s ‘key features and issues’ including:

- Bolshevik ideology in theory and practice
- Competing visions for the Bolshevik Party and the USSR
- The Bolshevik consolidation of power
- Political and economic transformation
- Aims, nature and effectiveness of Soviet foreign policy

In addition, the focus of study point about the impact of the consolidation ties a crucial thread between the ‘survey’ and the remainder of the topic. It leads directly forward to the power struggle points and, we would argue, the entire section covering ‘the Soviet state under Stalin’. Stalinism was, after all, a response or solution to the problems created by the consolidation of power in the USSR and the changing world order of the 1930s.

What follows is an attempt to unpack the focus of study dot-point ‘the impact of the Bolshevik consolidation of power, including the creation of the USSR’. In setting this out, we have tried to demonstrate clear links to the historical literature to show that the ideas we have included are not drawn from our imagination but from recent historiography. In other words, we think that
what we have set out below approximates what leading historians would say if asked to answer the question: what were the impacts of the Bolshevik consolidation of power.

Our central argument underpinning these ideas is this: the Bolshevik consolidation of power left the Party in command of vast territory but for many Party leaders they were in an unsatisfactory position by 1928. To put this another way, the impact of the Bolshevik consolidation was that it made the Party the dominant political power in the USSR while also creating serious practical instabilities and ideological contradictions within their government.

We try to follow this argument through five key areas: the Bolshevik Party, the government, the economy, the USSR and foreign policy.

The Bolshevik Party and the Soviet people

The period of the consolidation of power had a profound impact on the Bolshevik Party. The desperate military struggle that defined much of this period increasingly pushed the Party toward military structures, military solutions and ‘military speak’ in everything they did. Claiming victory over internal ‘counter-revolutionaries’ and external ‘capitalist powers’ gave the Party a powerful ‘foundation myth’ that was not really replaced until the end of the Second World War in 1945 after the victory over Nazism.

In addition, a Party that was accustomed to energetic internal debate before 1917 increasingly became intolerant of different views. The decree ‘On Party Unity’ enforced from 1921 banned ‘factionalism’ within the Bolshevik Party and over time was used by men like Stalin to stifle debate about policy and the future of the Party and the USSR. It was used to shut down groups like the ‘Worker’s Opposition’ who criticised which represented a large portion of the working classes.

As for the people, by the end of 1924 they were now citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) – see section below for a lengthier discussion of this. They had not experienced peace since the first half of 1914; now a decade ago. Although many did not support the Bolsheviks, most were willing to avoid further conflict by accepting the Party’s position of dominance. Especially after the more relaxed economic policies under the NEP were implemented in 1921, most were content to live-and-let-live and find a way to survive in the new society of which they were part.

Referring to these changes within the Party and broader society, Eric Dorn Brose has argued that: … people -party officials, workers and peasants, parents and children - changed. Contemporary doctors and psychiatrists worried that mass slaughter had decimated society’s mainstays, the family and the community; ruined respect for human life; and caused widespread mental illness. For many years subsequent historians concurred that war and civil war brutalized the population and coarsened public life to the point where much worse atrocities - the mass executions of the 1930s - became all but inevitable. Although life regained a normalcy of sorts, the past nevertheless bequeathed a heavy burden, for survivors were psychically weaker, emotionally less resilient, less prone to denounce wrongdoing, and more inclined to bury heads in the sand … For their part, party zealots exited the civil war eager to build the communist utopia and extremely suspicious of non-communist enemies who might try to wreck this grand social experiment. From the Kremlin leadership down to the rank and file, moreover, cruder Bolsheviks waited for the moment to demonstrate how well they had learned the civil war’s brutal “lessons” about dealing with opponents.

In his view, the period of consolidation did not just allow the Bolsheviks to eliminate the most organised opposition within the former empire, it affected their internal culture and their view of the task that lay ahead of them.

The Government (Sovnarkom)

The government created by the Bolshevik coup in October 1917 was called Sovnarkom. This government was dominated by Bolsheviks from the start and effectively became little more than a mouthpiece of the Bolshevik Party. In its original conception, Sovnarkom should have been a government responsible to the soviet movement which represented a large portion of the working classes in Russia. When soviets across the former empire did not align with the Bolshevik agenda, however, they were often marginalised and or simply shut down. As a result, a government that should have been broadly democratic (by representing a large part of the population) became a one-party system that was tied to the Bolshevik Party who only represented a minority of the population.

To maintain control over the majority of the population, Sovnarkom relied heavily on political violence through the Cheka (the secret police) and the Red Army (which included 5 million men by 1921). Sovnarkom also tried to make some concessions (eg. the NEP) to the population to prevent further rebellions and disturbances after the Civil War was won but there is no escaping the fact that brute
force was now a central and seemingly permanent feature of their rule. Lenin and the Bolsheviks always knew that a revolution in Russia would be a violent struggle but they did not expect that political violence would become a vital element of its ongoing operation.

This trend towards relying on violence and coercion can be linked directly to Sovnarkom’s experiences in the Civil War which was, after all, the environment in which they created their key institutions of terror (the Cheka, concentration camp-style prisons and the Red Army). Commenting on this growing dictatorship of Sovnarkom in his recent book *The Soviet Union: A Short History*, Mark Edele wrote the following:

Neither the economic liberalization [NEP], nor the cultural experiments, nor the growing field of welfare implied democratization [in the political sphere]. To drive home the point, the Soviets had forced the dissolution of the Mensheviks and arrested 5 000 of them in early 1921. In 1922, they organized a show trial of 12 leading Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs), once the Bolsheviks’ most popular rivals on the left. All 12 accused were sentenced to death and although the sentences were commuted to life imprisonment, the message was clear: the partial retreat in economic matters was not to be accompanied by a political thaw [relaxation]. A group of 160 leading ‘bourgeois’ intellectuals who had not voluntarily gone into exile were expelled from the Soviet Union later in the year. The dictatorship became stronger just when the economic reins were somewhat slackened.

Or as Trotsky himself put it in 1923: ‘We [the Communist Party [Bolsheviks]] are the only Party in the country, and in the era of dictatorship there can be no other way’.

Both the Party and the government it controlled, were centralised during the period of consolidation and this had a lasting effect on the politics of the USSR. Many historians would agree that by 1924 the government did not represent a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ but a ‘dictatorship of the Bolshevik Party’.

The Soviet Economy

The impact of the Bolshevik consolidation of power can also be seen in the sphere of economics. The New Economic Policy (NEP) introduced at the Tenth Party Congress in 1921 was deeply unsatisfactory for many Bolsheviks. Critics believed that the policies that made up the NEP were too close to capitalism because they allowed private production and private trade – both economic strategies that could allow certain individuals to ‘exploit’ other people, accumulate wealth and become a new ‘class’ within the USSR. To those deeply committed to Marx’s vision of a classless society this was too much. Lenin defended the policy by claiming that it was only to be temporary (a ‘strategical retreat’) and that Sovnarkom would retain control of the most important features of the economy, what he called the ‘commanding heights’: banks, heavy industry and foreign trade.

The disagreement and tension created by the NEP became one of the lasting impacts of the Bolshevik consolidation of power. The NEP essentially created a set of nagging questions at the heart of Sovnarkom’s rule: what is the best path to communism under the present circumstances? How hard and fast can we push the Soviet people toward the ultimate goal of creating a new society and a new world? Should we make concessions with the people or use force to haul them into the future? David Hoffman puts the fundamental problem with the NEP in the following terms:

Over time, the New Economic Policy succeeded in reviving the country’s economy… But the NEP system was deeply unpopular among Party members and workers. They resented the capitalists – known as NEPmen – who became rich operating small factories and shops. Some NEPmen flaunted their wealth… Party members asked why they had shed blood during the Revolution and Civil War, only to see the capitalists return and exploit workers once again. The New Economic Policy also presented a myriad of social problems. Workers faced high levels of unemployment… Drug use became rampant… Petty crime also spread… The Revolution was supposed to eliminate the social problems of the tsarist era, but instead these problems persisted, and in many ways worsened. Party members blamed NEP capitalism for social ills, and many of them wished to abandon the New Economic Policy altogether.

In the years following Lenin’s death some Bolsheviks continued to defend the NEP, others argued that it should be tweaked and still others claim that it was a betrayal of everything the Bolshevik revolution and the civil war stood for.

These debates over the Soviet economy were one of the most important dimensions of the power struggle that followed Lenin’s death in 1924. Trotsky argued for ending the NEP quickly and moving to industrialise by squeezing the peasants through heavy taxes and sheer force. On the other hand, Bukharin and his supporters thought the NEP was at least stable and, although a slower strategy for building socialism in the USSR, that it would eventually lead to industrialisation. They also believed that the NEP had one additional benefit, that it was the surest way of maintaining peasant support for...
Sovnarkom and maintaining the *smychka* (the cooperative relationship between workers and peasants).

Stalin himself wavered between these positions throughout much of the 1920s as the power struggle evolved. At first, he sided with Bukharin to defeat Trotsky but once he was successful he then turned against Bukharin and the NEP too. Ultimately, and perhaps with a touch of irony, Stalin implemented a set of policies from 1928-29 that looked more like Trotsky’s radical agenda than Bukharin’s more gentle vision.

There were also growing concerns that economic planning and tight government regulations on banking, large-scale industry and foreign trade were contributing to a growing ‘bureaucratisation’ of the USSR. These critics, often from within the Party itself, were worried that the growing number of government agencies were being filled with people who were not true Bolsheviks but rather opportunists – for example, people who just wanted jobs but cared little for Bolshevik principles. For these critics, the state did not appear to be ‘withering away’ under Bolshevik rule but only becoming bigger and less ideologically pure.

To sum up this point, the impact of the Bolshevik consolidation can also be traced through the Soviet economy. The devastation of two wars and a disastrous set of policies used during the worst phase of the Civil War (War Communism) caused widespread unrest in the former empire. Attempting to ease this tension, Sovnarkom staged a strategic retreat to the NEP but for many Bolsheviks this only resulted in new problems, not a lasting solution.

**The nationalities and the creation of the USSR**

The Russian empire ruled by the Romanovs was a vast, multi-ethnic state. When the 1917 Revolution broke out, only about 50% of the population were ethnic Russians. Generally, the Romanovs ruled the other national groupings within their boundary with an iron fist. The Polish and Finnish populations attempted to rebel on several occasions and were put down with force. Apart from the Grand Duchy of Finland, almost all of the nationalities ruled by the Romanovs were not allowed a distinct territory or government within the empire.

When the Bolsheviks took power in 1917, they had to decide on a policy for the nationalities. Would they let them become separate nations or force them to remain under Russian control? If they let them defect, they ran the risk of losing large portions of territory and large portions of the population ruled by the Romanovs. If they forced them to remain under Russian rule, they would appear no different to the empires that they had been criticising for so many years. Their solutions to the nationalities question were a key component of their consolidation of power but it was yet another source of friction within the Party.

On the one hand, Sovnarkom allowed some nationalities to defect from the empire and create their own nations. For example, Finland declared their independence on 6 December 1917. At the same time, the Bolsheviks attempted to force other nationalities to remain under their control. For example, they tried to force Poland to stay within the Russian sphere of influence through war (1919-1921). This attempt failed but they were more successful in forcing Stalin’s homeland of Georgia to submit to Sovnarkom’s rule after a brutal invasion by the Red Army in February 1921.

Some like Lenin were more inclined to support the defection of nationalities even though they hoped most would not choose to do so. Lenin believed that most groups who did defect would voluntarily become allies with the Russian republic after they realised it was superior to the ‘capitalist empires’ of western Europe. Other Bolsheviks believed that ‘nations’ should not exist at all because, according to some versions of Marxism, nations were simply a ‘bourgeois construct’ that would wither away under communism. This latter group believed that creating new nations from within the old Romanov empire would lead to nationalism, rebellion and further conflict.

In 1922, while Lenin was still alive, the Bolsheviks began to create a new ‘union of peoples’ within the boundaries of the old Russian Empire. This resolution was another compromise between extreme positions. In 1922 a treaty was signed giving birth to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) which contained four states: Russia, Belorussia, Ukraine and Transcaucasia. In fact, this new union included most of the territory controlled by the Romanovs excluding only Poland, Finland, the Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) and other smaller territories. These four republics in the USSR each controlled distinct territories and they were technically independent. In truth, the Russian republic remained dominant and all of the territories within the USSR were essentially ruled from Moscow (the capital of Russia).

In reality, the USSR masked deep suspicions held by Stalin and many other Bolsheviks that the nationalities posed a serious threat to the USSR and to communism. Even though Stalin was not Russian, he was always uneasy about the presence of these nationalities. He was also uneasy about the Sovnarkom policy of *korenizatsiia* (‘indigenisation’) that promoted elites from the different republics into positions of power, allowed the nationalities to speak their own language and, within limits, allowed them to celebrate their distinctive cultures. While this policy did receive support from non-Russians communists who had been treated poorly under the Romanovs, it also promoted national cultures and consciousness among the
different nations. Stalin always believed that if national identity became too strong it could lead to rebellion and that it needed to be watched carefully.

The American historian Alfred Rieber has recently summarised these problems by claiming that:

Many of these groups [allowed to create territories within the USSR] had participated in the Civil War and their loyalty remained doubtful in the eyes of the Bolshevik leaders. Stalin above all perceived the condition of divided nationalities as a two-edged sword: a potential threat of intervention and an opportunity for expansion [of the USSR]. And he well knew the history of subversion and rebellion in the borderlands which he absorbed from the history of his native Georgia and which he had witnessed in 1905 and again during the Civil War.\(^6\)

In summary, the founding of the USSR created as many problems as it solved for the Bolsheviks. In this way it could be seen as similar to the NEP: it was implemented but always debated and many within the Party were never completely comfortable with it. And so, the creation of the USSR affirms the central argument put forward here that the period of consolidation gave the Bolsheviks political dominance of the former Russian empire but it was not always stable and not always a position that satisfied important Party members. The net result was internal division and tension that could be traced right to the top of the Party and the Soviet government.

**Foreign Policy**

By this stage, it should be clear why we would argue that the Bolshevik consolidation of power was a mix of triumph and frustration. Lenin and the Party of 1917 believed, among other things, the following three ideas:

1. The creation of a new society would be a violent struggle
2. A transition to a socialist society in Russia would be rapid (and that it *must* be rapid)
3. The revolution unleashed in Russia would and *must* transform the world. In the lead up to the revolution Lenin famously said that: ‘... the Russian Revolution can achieve victory by its own efforts, but it cannot possibly hold and consolidate its gains by its own strength. It cannot do this unless there is a socialist revolution in the West.'\(^7\)

Lenin and the Bolsheviks were correct about the first idea. On the second two they proved to be more misguided and this was the source of great frustration and anxiety among leading members of the Party in the 1920s. By the end of 1924, the Bolsheviks were in command of the USSR but under the NEP the path to socialism now looked much longer and more uncertain than it did in 1917. In addition, their revolution had not been the first of many across Europe but almost the complete opposite. In 1924 the USSR was the only power with a communist government and most other nations treated the Soviet Union not as a global leader but as a global threat.

Commanding a weak economy in a hostile world put the Bolsheviks in a very tricky position. They did not have the military strength or the allies to mount a bold challenge against the ‘capitalist world’ but they also knew that they needed allies. Ideally for the Bolsheviks, the allies would be other socialist governments of wealthier nations who could help the USSR trade toward economic recovery and abundance. This could only become a reality if revolutions in other nations succeeded. Again, the Bolsheviks were presented with a conundrum: do we cooperate with capitalists to develop trade, alliances and technical support or do we try to support revolutions abroad? Open support for revolutions in France, Britain and other capitalist nations ran the risk of another military intervention in Russia. If, on the other hand, they did not try to help socialist governments come to power outside the USSR, they might remain isolated and vulnerable.

The result was yet another compromise. Even though the Bolsheviks never abandoned hope that other revolutions would create socialist governments in Europe and beyond, they landed in a position where they had to relax many of their radical foreign policy goals developed in the lead up to 1917. To avoid another attack by foreign powers like the one that took place during the Civil War, many Bolshevik leaders also accepted that they had to 'play nicely' for the foreseeable future. Alistair Kocho-Williams summarises the development of Soviet foreign policy in the 1920s in the following terms:
at loggerheads with one another; sometimes to the point of the one seriously jeopardizing the pursuit of the other."

In summary, the process of consolidating power and the international developments that immediately followed the Great War (1914 – 1918) also had a lasting impact on Soviet foreign policy. It forced the Bolsheviks to rethink and reform their global strategies and, like the NEP and the nationalities policies outlined above, some Bolsheviks believed that these strategies were not radical enough. For some it was a clear-cut betrayal of core Marxist beliefs of world revolution and internationalism. Relaxing the most radical elements of their foreign policy might have made the Bolsheviks safer in the USSR and helped them consolidate power but to many it seemed like they were turning their back on their role as global leaders of the working class.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy used to consolidate power</th>
<th>Contribution to the Bolshevik consolidation of power</th>
<th>Problems this strategy created for the Bolsheviks</th>
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<tr>
<td>War and terror</td>
<td>The Civil War and the growth of the Red Army and Cheka allowed the Bolsheviks to eliminate most organised opposition to Sovnarkom's rule in the former Russian empire. It was the primary tool used to extend and impose Bolshevik rule not only in the Russian heartland around Moscow and St. Petersburg but also in the borderlands to the west, south and east.</td>
<td>The process of winning the Civil War changed Bolshevik Party culture. It was increasingly militarised with military victory becoming a crucial part of Bolshevik identity. Less than 1% of Party members in 1924 had been members before the 1917 coup. These newer members became Bolsheviks in a context of war and this remained with them permanently.</td>
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<td>Political dictatorship</td>
<td>Political dictatorship was an essential factor that prevented the overthrow of Sovnarkom, the government created out of the 1917 coup. Eliminating alternative parties was part of the process of fighting the Civil War even after this was won, Sovnarkom never truly relaxed its monopoly of power.</td>
<td>The process of centralising power was difficult to reverse. First it was the dictatorship of a Party but over time power became increasingly concentrated in the hands of a group within that Party. Many historians would, therefore, say that this process ushered in a trend towards ‘oligarchy’ (rule by small group) in the USSR.</td>
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<td>Economic policy</td>
<td>War Communism helped the Bolsheviks survive the Civil War but it had to be replaced by the NEP in 1921 to ease growing social tension and this was largely successful in the short-term. The government maintained control of the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy to avoid a full retreat to capitalist principles.</td>
<td>Many Bolsheviks were deeply frustrated by the NEP which they saw as a major concession to capitalism and a much slower path to communism in the USSR. Others criticised the growing bureaucracy linked with the economy and the Party claiming that it was diluting the idealism central to Bolshevik tradition.</td>
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<td>Creation of the USSR</td>
<td>Creating the USSR in 1922-24 allowed the Bolsheviks to extend their control over most of the former Russian empire while publicly claiming that they had destroyed ‘empire’ in large parts of Eurasia. By creating distinct territories for the largest nationalities the Bolsheviks claimed to represent a new future.</td>
<td>The truth behind the USSR was that the non-Russian nationalities were still subordinated to Russian rule from Moscow. The USSR promoted an idealistic future ‘union of peoples’ but many Bolsheviks held strong concerns that these distinct national groups might rebel and cause problems for the USSR in the longer-term.</td>
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<td>Foreign Policy</td>
<td>In 1917 the Bolsheviks believed that a revolution in Russia would ignite the working classes in other countries. When this failed to eventuate, they relaxed their foreign policy to avoid the outbreak of another war they were not yet ready for.</td>
<td>Relaxing Soviet foreign policy may have helped increase the safety of the USSR in the 1920s but for many Bolsheviks it was a betrayal of world revolution (the heart of their mission). It was an unsatisfactory compromise that needed to be fixed.</td>
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Conclusion

Most of the leading Bolshevik figures who lived to witness the seven years following 1917 agreed that the consolidation of power had blown their revolutionary ship off course. At the same time, all of them also believed that the ship was still sailing and that they would ultimately find their destination. The key question was not whether to continue the journey but how to navigate through the challenges they faced after consolidating power.

To put all of this another way, it is possible to see the consolidation of power as a period in which the Bolsheviks used a set of diverse military, economic and foreign policy strategies to win control of the former Russian empire. These strategies were much less successful in allowing the Bolsheviks to make much progress with their plans for transforming Russia, the region surrounding it or the world. Between the Bolsheviks and their dream of creating an industrial, abundant, stable and egalitarian society stood many problems created by the process of consolidation. How to solve those problems was a key part of the power struggle that emerged following the death of Lenin in 1924.

Ultimately, it was Stalin who won this contest. It was Stalin who was, therefore, able to impose his solutions on the USSR and, to some degree, the wider world. Both Stalin’s emergence as leader of the USSR and his ‘revolution from above’ initiated in 1928-29 cannot be understood without understanding the ‘impacts of the Bolshevik consolidation of power’ on the Party, Sovnarkom, the economy, the USSR and Soviet foreign policy.

Endnotes

1 Recent scholarship has certainly acknowledged that the year 1917 was less of a ‘decisive break’ than the Bolsheviks liked to claim. Peter Holquist and many other historians have, for example, convincingly argued that it is impossible to understand the Bolshevik state that emerged in Russia in 1917 without the context of a global war and the common trend among governments to centralise control of the political and economic spheres. So, most current historians try to place the Bolshevik consolidation of power within a broader context that stretches back to at least 1914 if not before. See for example, Peter Holquist, Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia’s Continuum of Crisis, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2002 and Mark Edele, The Soviet Union: A Short History, Wiley Blackwell, Hoboken, 2019, p. 87

2 Eric Dorn Brose, Europe in the Twentieth Century, Oxford, New York, 2005, p. 167. Orlando Figes made a similar point where he wrote: ‘The Civil War was a formative experience for the Bolsheviks. It became their model of success, the ‘heroic period’ of the revolution when ‘any fortress could be stormed’. It shaped their political habits for a generation – until 1941, when another example of military success supplanted it. When Stalin spoke of a ‘Bolshevik approach’ or of ‘doing things at a ’Bolshevik tempo’ – the Five Year Plans for example – he had in mind the Party’s methods in the Civil War. From the Civil War the Bolsheviks inherited their cult of sacrifice; their military style of government, with its constant ‘battles’ and ‘campaigns’ on ‘fronts’; their insistence on the need to struggle permanently against the revolution’s enemies, foreign and internal, which they saw everywhere; their mistrust of the peasants; and their prototype of the planned economy with its militarization of labour and utopian vision of the state as the maker of a new society.’ Orlando Figes, Revolutionary Russia: 1891 – 1991, Penguin, 2014, pp 167 – 168


7 Lenin quoted in David L. Hoffman, The Stalinist Era (Kindle version), Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 39

8 Alistair Kocho-Williams, Russia’s International Relations in the Twentieth Century, Routledge, 2013, p. 42